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I'm guessing you don't need to be reminded that in Brown 
v. Board of Education, 1 decided in 1954, the Supreme Court de-
clared segregation of the public schools by race unconstitutional. 
It may need recalling, however, that aside from reciting the facts 
and explaining why segregation hadn't been validated by his-
tory, the Court's opinion was entirely devoted to establishing 
the proposition that school segregation treated the races une-
qually, and more particularly that black children generally were 
harmed by it in ways that white children were not. 
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of 
children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even 
though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may 
be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal 
educational opportunities?2 
Thirteen years later the Court in Loving v. Virginia/ again 
unanimous, and again speaking through Chief Justice Warren, 
invalidated state "antimiscegenation" laws precluding black and 
white people from marrying each other. The Loving opinion 
was devoted in its essential entirety to reciting the facts and ex-
plaining why such laws hadn't been validated by history. Not a 
* Richard A. Hausler Professor of Law, University of Miami. 
1. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
2. Id. at 493 (emphasis added). 
3. 388 u.s. 1 (1967). 
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word was devoted to establishing the proposition that such laws 
treated the races unequally. 
Just a difference in emphasis, albeit a dramatic one? Actu-
ally no: further analysis of both cases renders the disparity more 
perplexing still. So far as Brown was concerned, the proof of 
general racial harm was, frankly, somewhat shaky, and appar-
ently is even more widely so regarded today. Where did the 
Court get its conclusion that black children in general were 
harmed by school segregation? First, from the proceedings be-
low in the Topeka case. (Brown in the Supreme Court was sev-
eral cases consolidated.) In that proceeding a number of experts 
had indeed testified that school segregation was harmful to the 
ability of black children to learn. But other experts testified that 
desegregation, by engendering insecurity on the part of black 
students, would actually impede their ability to learn.4 Nor were 
these opposing experts a collection of nuts and klansmen. They 
were academics also apparently concerned with the welfare of 
black children, whose credentials were comparable to those on 
the other side; and we know in hindsight that there was much 
truth in what they said as well.5 
Beyond that, as I said, the testimony relied on was given in 
the Topeka case. But given that the topic the Court had set for 
itself was black feelings of inferiority and their likely effect on 
learning, it might at least have paused to inquire whether such 
evidence (and the Topeka district court's findings6) automati-
cally translated to the consolidated cases-to Clarendon 
County, South Carolina, for example, with 2799 black students 
and 295 white students-and for that matter to the thousands of 
school districts across the country that technically were not in-
volved in the litigation but would effectively be bound by the 
Court's mandate. 
That's where the Court's controversiaf footnote 11 came in, 
4. See also Gunnar Myrdal, 2 An American Dilemma 901-02 (Harper & Brothers, 
1944) ("'Some Negroes ... prefer the segregated school, even for the North, when the 
mixed school involves humiliation for Negro students .... "). Myrdal, of course, was 
conspicuously relied on by the Supreme Court. See also note 8. Cf. 1 An American Di-
lemma at 647 ("Racial pride and voluntary isolation is increasingly becoming the pattern 
for the whole Negro people."). 
5. See note 20. 
6. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494; see also id. at 494 n.10 (discussing the findings in the 
Delaware case). 
7. Albeit, at least initially, controversial for the wrong reason. The common con-
temporary criticism that by citing such works the Court was engaging in "sociology 
rather than law" seems an ignorant one. If the question is whether the experiences of 
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citing certain reports and books by psychologists that, according 
to the Court, "amply supported" its finding that even physically 
equal segregated schools had a negative impact on the ability of 
black children to learn. Well intended all, but unfortunately, 
when not simply irrelevant to the Court's point,8 at least now the 
object of widespread professional criticism.9 
two groups of people are equal, where better to look than social-psychological studies? 
The questions raised by this comment go instead to the reliability of the works cited and 
their relevance to the question the Court set itself, and beyond that to the relevance of 
the question the Court set itself to the case before it. 
8. The argument of Theodore Brameld, Educational Costs in R.M. Maciver, ed., 
Discrimination and National Welfare 37, 44-48 (Harper & Brothers, 1949), and Myrdal, 
An American Dilemma (cited in note 4), was that black schools were not in fact tangibly 
equal, an argument the Legal Defense Fund had sensibly waived in order to obviate the 
need to prove inequality school by school. E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United 
States 674-81 (The Macmillan Company, 1949), similarly does not address the psycho-
logical effects of segregation. 
9. "Virtually everyone who has examined the question now agrees that the Court 
erred (in citing the social science sources]. The proffered evidence was methodologi-
cally unsound." Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elabo-
ration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court. 42 L. & Contemp. Probs. 57, 
70 (Autumn, 1978). Brown's most relevant citation was to the "doll study" reported in 
Kenneth B. Clark, The Effects of Prejudice and Discrimination in Helen Leland Witmer 
and Ruth Kolinsky, eds., Personality in the Making 135, 142 (Harper & Brothers, 1952). 
It consisted of showing African-American and white children brown and white dolls and 
asking them which they'd like to play with, which "looked bad," and related questions. 
Disturbingly large percentages of the black children tested expressed a preference for 
the white doll. However, other variables were notoriously not controlled for. Elaine S. 
Brand, Rene A. Ruiz and Amado M. Padill, Ethnic Identification and Preference, 81 
Psycho! Bull. 860 (1974); Phyllis A. Katz and Sue Rosenberg Zalk, Doll Preferences: An 
Index of Racial Attitudes?, 66J. Educ. Psycho!. 663 (1974). Indeed, the implications of 
the Clark study for Brown appear to be worse than indeterminate, in that a substantially 
larger percentage of black children attending integrated schools (in the north) had an 
aversive reaction to the brown doll than did black children attending racially segregated 
schools. (Thirty-seven percent of the surveyed black children from segregated schools 
preferred to play with the brown dolls as opposed to 28% of those from integrated 
schools; 49% of the black children from segregated schools said the brown doll looked 
bad, as opposed to 71% of the black children from integrated schools; 46% of the segre-
gated black children, as opposed to 30% of the integrated black children, characterized 
the brown doll as nice, etc.) Heaven knows what all this means, but one thing is clear: 
The Clark study did not lend credence to the proposition-true as it might be on other 
grounds-that desegregating the schools was likely to increase black self-respect. See 
also, e.g., William E. Cross, Jr., Shades of Black: Diversity in African-American Identity 
21,26-28 (Temple U. Press, 1991); Roy L. Brooks, Integration or Separation? A Strategy 
for Racial Equality 12-16 (Harvard U. Press, 1996); Nancy H. St. John, The Effects of 
School Desegregation on Children: A New Look at the Research Evidence in Adam 
Yarmolinsky, et al., eds., Race and Schooling in the City 84, 90-92 (Harvard U. Press, 
1981); Walter G. Stephan, School Desegregation: An Evaluation of Predictions Made in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 85 Psycho!. Bull. 217 (1978). 
Max Deutscher and Isidor Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segrega-
tion: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psycho!. 259 (1948), and Isidor Chein, 
What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facili-
ties?, 3 Int. J. Opinion & Attitude 229 (1949)-both cited by the Court-discussed the 
same survey, one that, as the articles' titles suggest, asked the right question. The only 
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And no matter what's going on there, it seems rather trans-
parently the case that Chief Justice Warren's remarks about how 
segregated schools can impede the learning opportunities of 
black children, eloquent as they were, had little if any bearing on 
the per curiam orders that carne down almost immediately 
thereafter, desegregating buses, golf courses and beaches, with-
out any psychological buttresses of the sort that were at least at-
tempted in Brown. 10 Obviously any sort of state-imposed-
which is in context to say white-imposed-racial segregation 
must have hurt many black people terribly: I know it would have 
hurt me. But others probably not so much, and more to the 
point the Court, having set for itself the burden of 
demonstrating that segregation harmed the black race 
generally-in fact it made this Brown's central focus-ended up 
doing something short of a stellar job of carrying it. 
Loving had a very different structure. Here the Court 
didn't even try to prove that the law in issue hurt black people 
more than white people. Is that because they assumed it was 
obvious that it did? It doesn't seem so: black people couldn't 
marry white people, white people couldn't marry black people, 
and any assumption that it's more of a privilege to marry a white 
person than a black person seerns-1 hate to throw the word 
around but it seems in order here-racist.n 
problem is that they asked it of fellow social scientists rather than more directly studying 
the effect on children. This is of some relevance, of course-an unsurprising replication 
of what common sense would seem to suggest-but not much more. (Interestingly, the 
surveyed population opined with nearly equal frequency that segregation had a detri-
mental psychological effect on the segregating white population, a package that begins 
to sound suspiciously like a bundled judgment that segregation is a bad thing, as of 
course it is.) The final work cited by the Court, Witmer and Kotinsky, ch. 6, relies on the 
Deutscher-Chein study for the proposition that segregation hurts both groups. 
10. See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 
877 (1955) (public beaches and bathhouses). 
11. Neither-assuming one thinks this should matter-was there any showing that 
anything resembling a majority of black people (or white people, or anybody) would 
have married someone of another race but for such laws; nor, obviously, could there 
have been. (In 1963, despite the fact that most states permitted such marriages, Loving, 
388 U.S. at 6 & n.5, "just 0.7 percent of all the new marriages that included a black part-
ner were racially mixed." Stephan Themstrom and Abigail Themstrom, We Have Over-
come, New Republic, at 28 (Oct. 13, 1997) (title unendorsed)). 
Aficionados will have noticed that I have oversimplified Loving somewhat, albeit 
not in any way that's important to this discussion. In 1967 white people outnumbered 
black people in Virginia about four to one, which made the pool of possible spouses 
smaller for black people than for white people. If the pool of potential husbands was 
smaller, however, so was the pool of black women seeking husbands (and vice versa), 
thus keeping the ratios about the same as they were for white people. Does that make it 
racially equal? Not quite: A Lena Home or Dorothy Dandridge with comparatively 
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The first time I worried about this was two years before 
Loving, when I was clerking for Chief Justice Warren and the 
Court had before it a case similar in all currently relevant re-
spects, McLaughlin v. Florida. 12 Against the background of 
Brown it bothered me that black and white people did indeed 
seem to be treated equally by the law in issue: where was the 
denial of equal protection? Well, my mother didn't raise any 
stupid children, and before too long I worked out a solution: fo-
cus on the couples. Racially mixed couples were being treated 
worse than racially uniform couples, and wasn't that a racial 
classification? Kind of, I guessed. In any event wasn't this cou-
ple/couple classification, however previously unrecognized, sus-
pect in its own right? So it seemed to me at the time, and for 
that matter it still does. 13 
Of course my contortions were unnecessary. There's no re-
little reason to worry about competition from any quarter-! choose those two not be-
cause I'm old but rather in the interest of historical congruity; at least that's my story-
would be disadvantaged vis-a-vis a comparably heart-stopping white woman (supply 
your own example, if you're able). But enough already: The Court didn't mention the 
size of the potential spouse pool and obviously it didn't figure in the decision, nor would 
racial proportions closer to 50150 have made a particle of difference. 
Moreover, given the circumstances of its passage, the Virginia statute was certainly 
more of an insult to black people and other minorities than to white people. This is 
borne out- as if it needed to be-by the fact that the law forbade white people to marry 
nonwhites (unless their "nonwhite blood" was American Indian and less than one-
sixteenth-this, the legislative history made clear, was to "honor" the descendants of 
Pocahontas and John Rolfe) but black people and Asians and (more than one-sixteenth) 
Indians could marry each other. That somewhat increased the potential spouse pool for 
those groups but underscored the limited purpose of the "Racial Integrity Act" -to wit, 
preserving the "integrity" of the white race-and thus the insult. This the Court did 
mention, but announced in no uncertain terms that it didn't matter, that it would just as 
quickly have invalidated a statute that "even-handed(ly ]" preserved the "integrity" of all 
races. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12 n.ll. 
12. 379 U.S. 184 (1964), invalidating a state statutory scheme that made habitually 
occupying the same room overnight a crime only when committed by a Negro and a 
white person who were not married to each other. Proof of intercourse was not re-
quired. Fornication was punished for all unmarried couples: three month;, in jail ordi-
narily, one year if the couple comprised a Negro and a white person. Interracial mar-
riage was of course also proscribed. 
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund argued, as it often did in those days, that "Ne-
gro" was void for vagueness-an argument not reached and which presumably would 
have been anathema more recently. (The word became politically incorrect, but so did 
the notion that the concept it denoted has no determinate content.) Florida argued, as 
southern states often did in those days, that the "alleged Fourteenth Amendment" had 
not been properly ratified and thus was not part of the Constitution. Maybe 1964 isn't as 
recent as I like to suppose. 
13. The Court opinion framed the issue thus-McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188 ("It is 
readily apparent that § 798.05 treats the interracial couple made up of a white person 
and a Negro differently than it does any other couple"); id. at 196 ("§ 798.05 singles out 
the promiscuous interracial couple for special statutory treatment")-but wisely did not 
highlight the issue. 
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quirement that one raising a claim of unconstitutional racial dis-
crimination prove that the law in issue disadvantages all or even 
a significant number of members of his race: all he has to prove 
is that it disadvantages him on account of his race. If a traffic 
cop tells someone he's stopped for doing 60 in a 55-mph zone 
that the reason he singled him out-he generally looks the other 
way unless someone's doing 68-is that he (the driver) is black, 
the driver has a solid race discrimination claim, even if he can't 
prove that a single other black driver has been thus treated, let 
alone all or even most of them. Similarly Loving turns out to be 
a clear case of racial discrimination: under Virginia law only 
white females could marry Richard Loving, just as only non-
white males could marry Mildred Jeter. 14 The complainants were 
under no obligation to prove that even a single other person 
wanted to marry either one of them, or for that matter that any-
one else wanted to marry "outside" his or her race-let alone 
that the law harmed one race more than the other. 
So what was going on in Brown? Why all this attention to 
the question whether black children generally were harmed? 
Why wasn't it sufficient for the plaintiffs to allege-and, if 
pressed, to demonstrate-that they were injured by consignment 
to separate schools on account of their race? Obviously they 
were: can you think of another reason why someone would sub-
ject herself to what they must have gone through by virtue of 
having brought the suit? And if that inference is too glib, have 
Ms. Brown examined by a psychologist to see whether state 
relegation to a separate school for nonwhite children was im-
peding her education and sense of self-esteem. Forget Kenneth 
Clark and Gunnar Myrdal: all Ms. Brown should have had to 
show was that the racial classification was hurting her, not that it 
was hurting every black child assigned to a black school, or even 
most of them.15 
14. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("Equal protection of the laws is 
not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities"). 
15. The fact that these consolidated cases were class actions would alone have re-
quired a showing or at least a plausible and unrebutted assertion that the members of 
the class, which is to say the black children in the four districts named, were generally 
harmed by segregation. However, it did not require the Court's assertion that segrega-
tion harmed African-American children generally, which undoubtedly accounts for the 
fact that the Court mentioned only in passing that these were class actions, and certainly 
gave no indication of believing that it was the reason for footnote 11. (It wasn't men-
tioned until the opinion's final paragraph, which dealt not with group harm but rather 
with the issue whether the question of remedies should be, as it was, put over for rear-
gument. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.) You should thus feel free to put the fact that these 
were class actions on your list of reasons the finding of group harm bore some relevance 
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Or maybe not. Suppose Wilfred Suggins sues the city on 
equal protection grounds, claiming that the fact that his name 
appears in the second volume of the city directory it publishes-
it's arranged alphabetically-causes him no end of psychological 
damage. "It makes me feel like a second-class citizen," he al-
leges, asking the court to order that the city directory henceforth 
be published in one volume or that it not be published at all. 
What's more, his analyst backs him up (as indeed would others 
should the court see fit to appoint them): "I'm aware there are 
no other reported cases of what my upcoming paper will call the 
'Second Volume Syndrome,' but it's true: this thing is driving 
Mr. Suggins over the edge. He starts hyperventilating whenever 
he's introduced to anyone whose name begins with the letter A, 
B, or C. As you can imagine, his law practice has suffered con-
siderably." 
Of course Suggins would almost certainly lose on the mer-
its. But the case wouldn't get that far-the harm alleged cer-
tainly appears to be genuine, but it isn't legally cognizable, basi-
cally on the ground that Suggins is, well, a crackpot actually, 
though out of professional courtesy we'll call him hypersensi-
tive. Thin-skinned, perhaps. 
Toned down, that was the state's central argument in 
Brown-that like Mr. Suggins, the complainants weren't tangi-
bly treated worse than anyone else. Just as he was merely put in 
a separate, but equal, book, the argument would run, the com-
plainants in Brown were merely put in a separate, but equal, 
school, and as the Court opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson had 
pointed out, if that bothers them, it's essentially because they're 
hypersensitive: 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument 
to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of 
the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferi-
ority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the 
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction on it. The argument necessarily assumes that if, 
as has been more than once the case, and is not unlikely to be 
so again,C6J the colored race should become the dominant 
power in the state legislature, and should enact a law in pre-
to Brown. As you do so, however, please keep in mind that that fact seemed relevant to 
the Court only respecting an entirely separate issue and thus almost certainly did not 
drive, even in part, the finding of group harm. At all events it cannot remotely serve to 
explain the breadth of the Court•s finding. 
16. I'm betting you too had forgotten that phrase. 
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cisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race 
to an inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at 
least, would not acquiesce in this assumption. 17 
Now we're in a position to understand the Warren Court's 
disquisition on how black children generally were harmed by 
segregation. 18 It was there to demonstrate that contrary to the 
state's central claim, Ms. Brown and her co-plaintiffs weren't 
Wilfred Suggins, that despite the fact that they (unlike the 
speeder and unlike Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving as well19) 
were "simply" being separated from white children, the psychic 
injury they alleged was not onlJ real but also widespread and, 
indeed, entirely to be expected. 
We also can stop looking the other way when someone 
raises the alleged irrelevance or shortcomings of the sources on 
which the Court relied. Of course they weren't perfect- Iocca-
sionally admit that even about my own work-but it doesn't 
take an air-tight demonstration of normality to lift a complain-
ant out of the Wilfred Suggins category.11 You will thus be re-
17. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
18. Obviously another reason the Court looked for general racial harm is that it 
knew that it was writing an opinion not just for the four school districts before it, but for 
the nation, and thus wanted its finding of harm to be limited neither to the named plain-
tiffs nor to the named defendant school districts. (Of course, Loving also was regarded 
as a nationally binding precedent, but the harm to anyone forbidden to marry the person 
she loves is palpable. See note 19.) 
19. The schools in question were for reasons of litigation strategy stipulated to be 
tangibly equal, but Ms. Jeter and Mr. Loving were obviously unique-neither the tangi-
ble equivalent of anyone else on earth. (Not even the Plessy Court could have re-
sponded with a straight face that their appropriate remedy was to find other fiancees 
similar to their current ones in every respect but race.) 
20. Of course the Court was aware that desegregation would harm some black 
children in some ways, see note 4 and accompanying text, and obviously some white 
children too. Undoubtedly it felt that over time the psychological benefits would out-
weigh the harm (though it probably underestimated the time it would take for that to 
become evidently true). However, the harms imposed by segregation and those im-
posed by desegregation are not constitutionally symmetrical. Segregated schools that 
inflict injury on a particular racial group are unconstitutional. There cannot be (and at 
no point could there have been) even arguably a constitutional right to segregated 
schools, even assuming desegregation to be injurious to one or more groups. While the 
Constitution routinely scrutinizes laws that treat some people better than others-
strenuously when the distinction is drawn along racial lines-it is ordinarily tolerant of 
laws that treat groups, racial or otherwise, the same. See John Hart Ely, On 
Constitutional Ground 306-11 (Princeton U. Press, 1996). 
21. Indeed, as others have suggested, the Court probably would have been better 
off not citing sources for the proposition that segregation harms black people, but rather 
greeting the argument in opposition with "A white legislature tells you that because of 
your color you're not fit to go to school with their children, and you're not hurt? Get 
serious." See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 
Yale L.J. 421 (1960). 
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lieved to learn that despite the paradoxical disjunction between 
their argumentative structures, Brown and Loving both got it 
exactly right. You can go back to sleep, and in the morning 
worry about something else. 
